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Abstract The value turn in epistemology generated a particularly influential 
new position – virtue epistemology. It is an increasingly influential epistemological 
normative approach that opts for the intellectual virtues of the epistemic agent, 
rather than the truth-value of the proposition, as the central epistemic value. In 
the first part of this article we will attempt to briefly explain the value turn and 
outline the basic aspects of virtue epistemology, underlining the diversity of 
epistemic attitudes associated with this approach and their positive impact on 
expanding epistemological horizons. The second part will be focused on the 
virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate 
for evaluating social processes such as, for example, testimony and conversational 
practices in general. In the third section we will show how the psychiatric and 
psychotherapeutic communicational act can be more efficiently analyzed and 
evaluated from the perspective of the virtue of epistemic justice, than from the 
traditional epistemic approach based on a monist concept of truth. The fourth 
and fifth section synthesize the discussion by introducing the concept of 
hermeneutic psychotherapy as a therapeutically and epistemically favorable 
framework for evaluating communicational acts in psychotherapy.
Keywords: virtue epistemology, epistemic responsibility, epistemic justice, 
philosophy of psychiatry and psychotherapy, testimony, hermeneutic psychotherapy
1. Introduction 
Truth has been traditionally considered the fundamental and principal epis-
temic value and goal, analogously to the role of good/right in ethics, the sig-
nificance of justice in political philosophy or of beauty in aesthetics. Howev-
er, increasingly intense debates regarding epistemic values and intellectual 
virtues within the last two decades have resulted in the introduction of plural 
epistemic goals and virtues as an alternative to the traditional value monism 
of truth (Kvanvig 2005, Haddock, Millar and Pritchard 2009)
Discussions regarding epistemic values are partially related to different un-
derstandings of epistemology as a philosophical discipline and of the scope 
of its research topics. If epistemology is narrowly understood as a theory of 
knowledge, then it is natural to define the truth-value of beliefs as the fun-
damental epistemic goal and limit the role of the epistemologist to defining 
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the conditions of justification and conceptually analyzing knowledge in gen-
eral (David 2001). However, if we define the goal of epistemology as an in-
quiry into the very process of acquiring knowledge – into different ways of 
forming beliefs, distinct cognitive products such as assumptions and work-
ing hypotheses, doxastic attitudes such as trust or belief revision, and various 
kinds of cognitive accomplishments such as attributing meaning to empirical 
data and finding solutions to problems – then it is possible to propose dif-
ferent epistemic values. Following the latter understanding of epistemolo-
gy, its central aim becomes not only to define and determine the conditions 
of knowledge, but to critically assess the cognitive processes of making de-
cisions and acquiring beliefs, the doxastic attitudes of evaluating, retaining 
or revising beliefs, and the influence of society on epistemic processes and 
their outcomes1. Successful acquisition of knowledge does not necessarily 
need to be evaluated in terms of true beliefs, but can rather strive towards 
adjusting beliefs to experience, achieving coherence with evidence and em-
pirical adequacy, promoting understanding, nurturing theoretical wisdom, 
producing rational assumptions and promising working hypotheses, or at 
conducting epistemically responsible research (Kvanvig 2005, 2010)
It is possible to simultaneously accept the list of epistemic values suggested 
by Jonathan Kvanvig and to consider truth the only, ultimate and primary 
epistemic goal, as long as we reduce the aforementioned values to instru-
ments which indicate that certain beliefs, hypotheses and assumptions have 
a chance of being true, or that certain processes have a chance of successful-
ly leading to truth2. In this sense, the final acquisition of true beliefs would 
render all these additional epistemic values less important. If I have a true 
belief about the proper route leading to the cathedral, it is no longer rele-
vant whether this belief is congruent with my experience or whether it is 
based on reliable evidence3. Faced with this value problem, Kvanvig argues 
that epistemic value is not reducible to external success, or the formation 
of true beliefs, and that certain internal components of the the process of 
1  Such an understanding of epistemology coincides with John Locke’s original defi-
nition of epistemology as the study of the possibility of attaining true beliefs, the pro-
cesses of cognition and the scope of knowledge (Locke 1690). An extensive account of 
epistemology that acknowledges the epistemic properties of social processes and insti-
tutions is, for example, also fully accepted by Alvin I. Goldman (Goldman 2010).
2  Such a monist or reductionist perception of truth as the only intrinsic epistemic 
value is defended by, for example, L. BonJour, W. Alston and A. I. Goldman, (BonJour 
1985, Alston 1988, Goldman 2002.)
3  This is referred to as the swamping problem: if the only value of evidence lies in its 
relationship to a certain goal (truth), then the achivement of that goal disables us from 
addressing the instrumentally valuable features of beliefs (for example, the fact that they 
are based on evidence). For more information, refer to: Kvanvig 2003.
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acquiring beliefs retain their autonomous value4. For example, knowledge 
(justified true belief) surpasses true belief in being a kind of intellectual agen-
cy that entails additional value (access to reasoning and evidence makes a 
belief more coherent with other beliefs, facilitates understanding, and like). 
This attitude is shared by numerous proponents of virtue epistemology, who 
argue that intellectual success – true beliefs formed by utilizing intellectual 
virtues (wisdom, understanding, epistemic responsibility or like) – can be 
considered more valuable than mere true beliefs (especially if their acquisi-
tion is accidental) (Greco 2003, 2010,  Sosa 2003, 2007a, 2007b, Riggs 1998, 
2002, 2009). In short, many virtue epistemologists embrace the pluralism of 
intellectual virtues due to its ability to enrich and improve one’s intellectual 
life (Zagzebski 1996, Riggs 2003, Sosa 2003, Greco 2004). 
Kvanvig, on the other hand, not only questions the monist view of truth or re-
ductionism (the reduction of all values to the acquisition truth or the evasion 
of fallacies), but also claims that every cognitive success entails independ ent 
value, and that knowledge, understanding, wisdom, rationality, empirical 
adequacy, or like, ought to be regarded as separate epistemic values instead 
of being dismissed as instrumental or supplementary. Similarly, cognitive 
successes such as finding meaning in the course of an experience or being 
epistemically responsible can be elaborated without reference to truthful-
ness: for example, the empirical adequacy of a belief can have independent 
value in the context of the epistemic duty to base beliefs on empirical proof, 
reasons, evidence, or similar standards of epistemic consistency. In this case, 
epistemic duty is less related to truthfulness than to the goal of not being 
perceived as intellectually shallow, inconsistent, lazy or like. 
However, this article does not aim to side with either monists (reductionists) 
or pluralists in the discussion regarding epistemic values, nor does it strive 
to analyze the assets of different pluralistic approaches, such as the plural-
ism of additional values or the pluralism of intrinsic epistemic values. Our 
key goal is, above all, to emphasize the possibility, significance and necessi-
ty of broadening our understanding of epistemology to include its analyses 
of widely understood doxastic states, cognitive processes, acts and events. 
Secondly, we aim to demonstrate that such an extensive approach requires a 
broader definition of epistemic success and clearer relations between specif-
ic epistemic values and cognitive activities. The final goal of this article is to 
show how this extensive approach aids the epistemic evaluation of cognitive 
processes and intellectual activities (such as, for example, communicational 
acts between patients and psychiatrists), which would otherwise be exempt 
from epistemic inquiries. Finally, it is crucial to realize that this approach 
4  Refer to: Kvanvig 2003, 2005, 2010., and also to: Zagzebski 2003.
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improves the epistemic value of cognitive activities and results in more ef-
fective solutions to problems. 
2. The virtue of epistemic responsibility
The numerous strikingly different epistemological positions which are cur-
rently developing under the auspices of virtue epistemology – despite their 
divergent definitions of virtue and attitudes towards the epistemic relevance 
of certain issues – all share two fundamental stances. The first stance is the 
basic thesis of traditional epistemology (and especially emphasized within 
standard analytical epistemology) which defines epistemology as a norma-
tive discipline. Thus, in focusing on the normative aspect of epistemic eval-
uation, virtue epistemology does not consider normative standards or values 
conventional or relativistic, but presumes them to have a sort of objective 
validity5. The second stance, on the other hand, substantially deviates from 
the definition of the object of epistemological inquiry as a proposition, belief 
or doxastic state whose truthfulness, justification or rationality ought to be 
determined. Virtue epistemologists turn the focus of evaluation to epistemic 
intellectual agents (which include collective agents such as groups, commu-
nities, social systems, institutions or like). For example, an epistemological 
inquiry now tackles the question of whether an intellectual agent is capable 
of understanding her situation (despite possibly not having a true belief) or 
whether she was epistemically responsible in basing her beliefs on careful 
observation, inference, selection between particular hypotheses, consider-
ation of available evidence, or like. Intellectual virtues are the qualities of an 
agent which support her intellectual growth and fulfilment or that, simply, 
characterize her as a virtuous epistemic agent6. This explains why epistemol-
ogists who accept this approach, despite their emphasis on normativity, re-
main willing to explore empirical data (psychological, social, political, histor-
ical, etc.). The essential feature of this approach is its focus on analyzing the 
epistemic agent, her cognitive processes and general intellectual character, 
in order to promote intellectual development and welfare. In other words, 
this theory is aware of the practical benefits derived from its distinction of 
5 Goldman treats this particular feature as a central quality of the approach to episte-
mology capable of distinguishing actual epistemological projects from epistemological 
revisionism, a stance usually exemplified by various forms  of social constructivism, 
postmodernism and like. See: Goldman 2010. 
6  This makes it clearly evident that virtue epistemology is analogous to virtue ethics 
in focusing on agency and assessing the achievements of the individual (in this case, 
epistemic) agent with the aim of encouraging (in this case, intellectual) fulfillment. More-
over, authors like Linda Zagzebski emphasize the significance of this analogy in the 
context of their neo-Aristotelian approach to epistemology. See more in: Zagzebski 1996, 
1998, 2003a, 2003b, and in: Brady and Pritchard 2003.
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intellectual virtues and flaws, and the consequent critical attitude towards 
different cognitive processes and their outcomes. 
The advocates and sympathizers of virtue epistemology belong to two large 
and roughly defined camps7: (i) epistemologists who relate intellectual virtue 
to the cognitive capacities and dispositions of the epistemic agent (percep-
tion, reasoning, memory, etc.) by, for example, describing reliable cognitive 
capacities as virtuous because they lead to truth or knowledge8, and (ii) epis-
temologists who hold that intellectual virtues are (personal) characteristics 
subject to individual responsibility in the sense that each intellectual agent 
can and should deliberately develop virtues that support her intellectual 
achievements - virtues such as intellectual conscientiousness or openness to 
new knowledge9. In both cases, the epistemic goal can be found in promot-
ing intellectual or cognitive development. There is an additional distinction 
between the conventional and the alternative approach: while conventional-
ists focus on standard questions of contemporary Anglo-Saxon epistemology 
such as the definitions of knowledge, skepticism, justification or like10, the 
alternative approach focuses on the issues of deliberation, discussion, inqui-
ry, understanding and wisdom, taking into account the psychological, social, 
ethical and political aspects of forming beliefs11. Given that virtue epistemol-
ogists often find points of agreement or manage to reach compromise, it is 
particularly important not to regard these distinctions as rigid or final. For 
example, it is possible to argue that the epistemic responsibility of an agent 
is a personal disposition that responsibly leads towards truth (Greco 1999) 
or that justification and knowledge are states attained by practicing intel-
lectual virtues such as wisdom (Zagzebski 1996). 
For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the epistemologists who 
highlight the virtue of epistemic responsibility, regardless of whether it is 
perceived as a condition of intellectual development or a means of attain-
ing the epistemic goals of truth or justification. Irrespectively of whether 
epistemic responsibility is understood as a personal disposition or a char-
acter trait, there is certain consensus that this generic concept facilitates the 
definition of other intellectual virtues. Epistemic responsibility primarily 
emphasizes the active role of the epistemic agent and the element of choice 
(motivation) integral to intellectual agency. Thus understood, epistemic re-
sponsibility implies intellectual conscientiousness and the motivation to 
7  For more information, see: Greco 2011.
8  See more in: Sosa 1980, 1991, 2003, Goldman 2002, Greco, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 
2002, 2011.
9  See more in: Zagzebski 1996, 2003a, Code 1987, Fricker 2007, Montmarqet 1992, 
1993, Roberts and Wood 2007.
10  See more in: Sosa 1980, 2003, 2007a, 2007b, Zagzebski 1996, 2003a, 2003b.
11  See more in: Kvanvig, 2003, 2005, 2010, Riggs 1998, 2002, 2006, 2009, Fricker 2007.
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reach truth, or other epistemic values such as intellectual impartiality, open-
ness, willingness to exchange ideas, awareness of personal fallibility, a cau-
tious and balanced approach to reaching conclusions, intellectual curiosity 
and courage, intellectual humility and kindness, or like. The generic term 
of epistemic responsibility leads to the definition of epistemic justice as re-
flexive critical openness towards assessing the credibility of one’s own judg-
ments (hermeneutic justice), as well as the credibility of others (testimonial 
justice) (Fricker 2007). The notions of generalized epistemic responsibility 
and epistemic justice encourage the evaluation of cognitive processes and 
achievements such as scientific research and analyses, the formation of hy-
potheses, the allocation of trust in communicational acts, decision-making 
and like, by evaluating the agents’ personal conduct. For example, a curious 
scientist aware of her own fallibility and the influence of present values and 
theories on her judgments is shown as responsible towards her epistemic task 
of scientific research, thus being more likely to arrive at a true conclusion. 
Likewise, an epistemically just person who judges another person’s credi-
bility by remaining aware of her own stereotypes and prejudices about the 
other person’s social group has greater chances for acquiring and distribut-
ing knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus provides a normative framework 
for evaluating communicational acts, such as psychiatric sessions or psycho-
therapy, whose epistemic successes or failures cannot be fully described or 
evaluated from the perspective of truth. From the perspective of the psychi-
atrist/psychotherapist as an epistemic agent, the goal of psychiatric/psycho-
therapeutic communication is not to attain true beliefs (form true beliefs on 
the basis of testimonies made by patients), but to understand the client and 
solve the problem which led to that particular communicational act.
3. Epistemic justice and communicational acts 
The virtue of epistemic justice, first introduced by Miranda Fricker, has 
proven to be a generally important epistemic normative for evaluating com-
municational acts. Fricker focuses on those epistemic acts which are funda-
mentally social in involving other people and society as a whole12. Accord-
ing to Fricker, in order to understand the virtue of epistemic justice, one has 
to be aware of the wider context of forming and distributing beliefs with-
in a community. Individuals have the general ability to direct their agency 
12  Standard analytical epistemology mainly dealt with questions of the reliability of 
individual cognitive processes such as observation, reasoning, memory and like. Social 
epistemology, which has been intensively developing within the analytical approach in 
the last two decades, is becoming increasingly receptive to the epistemic evaluation of 
social practices, institutions and even social systems (such as, for example, the epistemic 
justification of democracy). See more in A. I. Goldman, (Goldman 2010). Miranda Fric-
ker thematically belongs to the field of social epistemology, (Fricker 2007).
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towards influencing others and demonstrating a kind of social power. Fric-
ker suggests a definition of social power as the (practically and socially con-
textualized) ability to control the behavior of others. This power can either 
be (actively or passively) manifested through the actions of individuals or 
can manifest itself on a purely structural level13. In short, each individual 
possesses a kind of social power that allows/enables her to control or in-
fluence other people. For example, this ability to influence or control can 
be manifested in deliberately assigning or denying other people credibility, 
in consciously dismissing them as reliable interlocutors, or like. By exercis-
ing this power, an individual can not only affect the other’s social status or 
inhibit their self-respect, but the deliberate denial of trust can also hinder 
their employment, stifle the development of their career or result in unjust 
legal proceedings. According to Fricker, the allocation of trust and credibility 
primarily depends on shared, socially imagined concepts of the social iden-
tities of certain groups. For example, an individual is likely to assign more 
trust to rich, privileged and male members of a certain society, or to exclu-
sive religious and ethnic communities. These imaginary concepts of social 
identities which influence personal agency and the usage of social power are 
nothing other than stereotypes. 
However, agents do not need to consciously accept these stereotypes as true 
because the manifestation of social power (related to belonging to a certain 
collective identity) fully operates on the level of imagined social identities. 
If a stereotype about a certain group identity (women, African-Americans, 
the poor, the mentally ill or like) embodies a negative prejudice towards the 
speaker (for example, the perception of women as irrational, African-Amer-
ican as lazy, the poor as incompetent, the depressed as unreliable, or like), 
the hearer underestimates the speaker’s credibility and their ability as an 
epistemic agent. This subjects the speaker to epistemic testimonial injustice. 
For example, someone can (consciously or unconsciously) underestimate the 
competence of women, the honesty of the poor, the credibility of the mental-
ly ill, or like, and thus affect the course of their lives. Another form of epis-
temic injustice, hermeneutic injustice, occurs when an important feature of 
an individual’s social experience is exempt from socially imagined concepts 
and, consequentially, from collective understanding. Hermeneutic injustice 
occurs in all situations in which an epistemic agent, due to society’s inabili-
ty to understand them, incorrectly interprets their own experience. For ex-
ample, a person with a history of mental illness can perceive themselves as 
unsuitable for a particular job due to the stereotype that dismisses them as a 
13  As suggested by Michael Foucault, power appears on a purely structural level when 
it is so thoroughly dispersed through the social system that no particular agent is needed 
to embody it. In such situations, people act only mere “mediators” of power. For more 
information, see: Dreyfus and Rabinov 1982.
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chronically maladjusted and incompetent individual. The continuous prac-
tice of this social injustice results in persistent and all-encompassing her-
meneutical marginalization of such individuals.
As previously emphasized, both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice have 
a practical effect on the “victim” of injustice by depriving them of epistemic 
self-confidence and socially disabling them from becoming who they might 
have been had they not been subject to such injustice. Within a psychiatric/
psychotherapeutic communicational act, the virtuous nature of epistemic 
justice lies in the neutralizing of prejudice and the stereotypes of negative 
valence, in the necessity of nurturing understanding and thus encourag-
ing the feeling of epistemic self-confidence which contributes to successfully 
solving the patient’s problem. We will proceed to explain why we argue that 
epistemic justice is one of the key epistemic values in the communicational 
act of psychiatry/psychotherapy. 
4. Philosophy of psychiatry and epistemic justice 
Instead of limiting it to the acts conducted by a licensed psychotherapist, this 
paper broadly understands the term ‘psychotherapy’ as a communicational 
act carried out by psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and psychotherapists 
with the aim of resolving/easing the mental suffering of their patient. Like-
wise, the role of the psychotherapist in a communicational act can be car-
ried out by a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a psychotherapist. The aim of 
the communicational act initiated by the patient is not (or is not primarily) 
to attain true information from the patient or to establish a true diagnosis, 
but to resolve the patient’s mental suffering. Namely, this communication-
al activity is exempt from traditional testimonial forms, which are aimed at 
providing the psychiatrist/psychotherapist with true information, in being 
a certain testimonial pathology that strives to resolve the patient’s problem 
through dialogue14. However, despite entailing pathological qualities inher-
ent to similar cases of testimonial pathology, this communicational act has 
numerous epistemological features, such as the assessment of the speaker’s 
credibility and the justification of trust, reflecting on one’s own fallibility, 
cultivating understanding, and like, which can and should be appropriately 
evaluated15. As we have previously argued, the best approach to the epistemic 
evaluation of such communicational acts is provided by virtue epistemology 
and, more precisely, by assessing the epistemic responsibility and epistemic 
justice of the psychiatrist/psychotherapist (in her role of the hearer in the 
testimonial situation). 
14  For further information about the pathology of testimony, see: Coady 2006.
15  The epistemic properties of the pathology of testimony are further discussed in 
Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar, 2012.
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The foundations underlying this attitude can be found within recent de-
bates in the philosophy of psychiatry regarding the implausibility of objec-
tively diagnosing mental disorder and the growing awareness that psychiat-
ric classifications of mental disorders may not accurately correspond to the 
real state of affairs. These approaches underline the essential role of subjec-
tive interpretations in defining the true nature of mental disorders (Bolton 
2008, Glover 2014). For example, Derek Bolton emphasizes the controver-
sial unsustainability of the assumption that certain prescribed medial norms 
or standards (DSM-5) of mental disorders correspond to the actual state of 
affairs (Bolton 2008).16 Moreover, he emphasizes the vague and incoherent 
nature of the definitions of mental disorders, the stigmatization and disqual-
ification of normal behaviors and the medicalization of personal and soci-
etal values. The ‘harmfulness’ and ‘dangerousness’ associated with mental 
disorders are often reducible to their detrimental effect on perceived social 
security – much like Fricker’s imaginary social concepts which are based on 
stereotypes – rather than being a reflection of the actual state of affairs. Jona-
than Glover wonders whether an allegedly objective mental disorder such as 
autism is truly a disorder or a neural anomaly, whether anti-social behavior is 
a disorder or crude amorality, and whether addictions are mental illnesses or 
moral failures (Glover 2014). Bolton explicitly concludes that a mental health 
professional should not exclusively aim to establish a true diagnosis, but to 
respond to the patient’s articulated problem and their desire to receive help.
Following these discussions in the philosophy of psychiatry, it may seem as 
if psychiatric communicational acts can only be perceived as a certain epis-
temological ‘pathology’ under the assumption that all epistemic acts have the 
solitary goal of reaching truth. However, we have shown how, in the light of 
recent scientific discussions, the value turn inherent to virtue epistemolo-
gy provides us with a theoretical and normative framework of approaching 
this act by evaluating its epistemic properties (with the aim of improving 
the epistemic properties of the communicational act and its impact on the 
patient’s well-being). We will proceed to elaborate the implications of epis-
temically evaluating communicational act in psychotherapy.
The psychotherapeutic communicational act potentially caters to both afore-
mentioned kinds of epistemic injustice – testimonial and hermeneutic in-
justice. Psychotherapy places testimony in a very specific social setting. The 
psychotherapist and the patient undertake the roles of both the speaker and 
the hearer, perceiving each other in a particular social context. However, the 
epistemic responsibility of the psychotherapist necessitates them to be both 
16  The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-5 
was published in 2013 by APA, the American Psychiatric Association as a general guideline 
for psychiatrically classifying and diagnosing mental disorders.
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a reliable source of information and interpretation (making them hermeneu-
tically just), and a responsible hearer capable of creating a context of mutual 
trust (demanding their just evaluations of testimonies and just assessments 
of the credibility of their patient). It ought to be emphasized that psycho-
therapy places the psychotherapist in a position of power. This type of power 
derives from the social perception of psychotherapy as a communicational 
act aimed at resolving psychological problems and difficulties. A person who 
enters a psychotherapeutic relationship hopes that the psychotherapist can 
improve their health, personal relationships and future prospects. The inter-
pretations provided by the psychotherapist’s power to analyze their client’s 
experience can significantly affect the patient.
In psychiatry/psychotherapy, the role of common imaginative concepts is 
assumed by widely accepted psychiatric/psychotherapeutic theories that at-
tempt to explain a patient’s behavior by using pre-defined psychopathologi-
cal explanations and classifications. The common imaginative concepts of 
these theories define, for example, the behaviors associated with neuroses, 
phobias, anxiety and depression, and describe the broadly understood posi-
tion of the patient within a psychotherapeutic encounter. In short, the epis-
temic responsibility of the psychotherapist requires their sensible approach 
to pre-defined norms and interpretations, and a reflexive attitude aimed at 
avoiding the stereotypes and prejudices which may hinder the correct per-
ception of their patient’s credibility. Due to their possibly detrimental in-
fluence on the speaker/patient, it is extremely important to raise awareness 
about the common areas of epistemic injustice within a psychotherapeutic 
communicational act. As a specific type of epistemic injustice that is neces-
sarily based on prejudice, testimonial injustice harms the speaker as an epis-
temic agent17. Any stereotypical interpretation and categorization of a patient 
can be a result of prejudice: the hearer (in our case, the psychotherapist) may 
disregard their patient’s testimonies as the irrelevant and confounding mus-
ings of a person undergoing mental suffering. The patient is then treated as 
cognitively unreliable in a way that excludes their interpretations from epis-
temic consideration by rejecting them as irrelevant pathological symptoms 
or approaching them with distrust. 
One of the fundamental causes of epistemic injustice is the prejudice that the 
patient is inherently incapable of understanding themselves. This early as-
sumption that the patient can only be properly understood by a psychotherapist 
17  Fricker distinguishes the concept of ‘innocent mistakes’ for which the agent is 
neither ethically, nor epistemically culpable. These are the cases of unfortunate epistem-
ic mistakes when the hearer simply falsely assesses the speaker’s reliability. Given that, in 
these cases, stereotypes and prejudice play no role in assessing the speaker’s realibility, 
Fricker doesn’t treat innocent mistakes as examples of testimonal injustice. (Fricker 2007).
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is widely accepted in, for example, psychoanalytical descriptions of human 
behavior as an expression of unconscious pathology18. A psychotherapist 
equipped with such a mind-set approached the communicational act by treat-
ing their patient as an untrustworthy epistemic agent. Such a psychothera-
peutic communicational act creates a social context founded on systematic 
epistemic injustice. While the speaker is always less reliable, the hearer as-
sumes the privileged (and more powerful) position of epistemic reliability. 
Considering the psychotherapist’s role of an expert in mental health, they 
can seriously hamper the societal perception of their patient’s social identity 
by epistemically underestimating them19. Let us note that such a testimonial 
situation is analogous in all aspects to the situations which Fricker defines as 
epistemically unjust.
By contrast, an epistemically just psychotherapist subjects the client’s testi-
mony to epistemic consideration and accepts it as epistemically authorita-
tive. Testimonial injustice can only be avoided through the neutralization of 
prejudices about the patient’s unreliability. Moreover, as an epistemic agent 
with the virtue of being epistemically just (the virtue of justly assessing tes-
timonies and the virtue of hermeneutic justice), the psychotherapist can only 
reach an epistemically valuable judgment if they interpret the patient’s words 
in a hermeneutic climate void of structural prejudice. Within the practical 
context of the psychotherapeutic process, a virtuous psychotherapist will 
be able to create a hermeneutical or interpretative context by engaging the 
patient in appropriate dialogue. An appropriate dialogue requires that the 
psychotherapist addresses their potential prejudices by assuming that the pa-
tient’s statements are their genuine experience and attempting to determine 
the patient’s existing resources for achieving set psychotherapeutic aims. A 
18  While this originated as the fundamental idea underlying psychoanalysis, many 
psychotherapeutic theories, such as psychodynamic and transactional analysis, have 
later assumed the idea that a psychotherapist is an expert in understanding their patient. 
Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis, for example, treats interpretation as a mere instrument 
of informing the client about their personal features which they are inherently incapable 
of grasping (Freud 1915).
19  In short, all situations in which an epistemic agent is underestimated as a reliable 
source of information due to having characteristics that incite social prejudice, can be 
regarded as examples of epistemic injustice in psychotherapy. One such example is the 
experience of a patient who sought a psychiatrist following a suicide attempt. The patient 
was born without the final knuckles on four of her fingers (partial syndication). Musi-
cally gifted and persistent, she completed a musical academy as a piano player. Her attempt 
to convey this information to her psychiatrist made him consider her psychotic and 
consequently misdiagnose her. All of the patients’ subsequent attempts to explain that 
she really was a piano player were unsuccessful and considered as further proof of her 
psychosis. Her resulting treatment with antipsychotics significantly hampered her re-
covery. (This experience was consensually shared by a patient of Inka Miškulin’s psycho-
therapeutic practice).
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virtuous psychotherapist will show respect for their patient’s self-knowledge 
and perceive their testimony as an account of their understanding of self. 
By approaching their testimony with conscientiousness, the psychotherapist 
makes their patient feel worthy of respect, rendering the mutual epistemic 
benefits clearly evident: while the psychotherapist remains open to relevant 
information necessary for solving the problem, the speaker gains self-confi-
dence and becomes receptive to new knowledge.20
5. Hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy 
There are various criteria for differentiating psychotherapeutic approach-
es. This paper stresses the criterion of differentiating psychotherapeutic ap-
proaches proposed by Hakam Al-Shawi (Al-Shawi 2006). He distinguishes 
the standard psychotherapeutic approach, the cognitive-behavioral approach 
and the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy. The standard psychother-
apeutic approach includes all psychotherapeutic practices that are equipped 
with a comprehensive theory and aim to provide the patient with insights 
into their mental states. While the cognitive-behavioral approach does not 
perceive insight as a curative method, it is also founded on a theory that pro-
vides a unified methodology of finding solutions to problems. The herme-
neutical approach to psychotherapy, on the other hand, equips the psycho-
therapist with knowledge necessary for properly understanding the patient 
and perceiving them as a unique individual. However, there are significant 
differences to the dominant perceptions of psychotherapy inherent to indi-
vidual psychotherapists or psychotherapeutic doctrines. For example, psy-
chotherapeutic literature includes numerous psychoanalytically oriented 
authors who have accepted a hermeneutic approach to defining and under-
standing the psychotherapeutic process21. We will therefore not limit our-
selves to particular psychotherapeutic approaches or doctrines, but will in-
stead emphasize the distinction between two radically different, and even 
contradictory, approaches to practical psychotherapy: namely, the objectivist 
and the hermeneutical approach.
20  Fricker encourages the union of intellectual and moral virtues within the concept 
of hybrid virtues. It should be noted that there is a moral dimension the act of trust. 
Having an epistemically valuable attitude towards a speaker implies a moral stance of 
appreciation, so perceiving a speaker as honest and reliable promotes a sense of trust. In 
other words, a sensible and reflexive attitude towards one’s own prejudice, or those 
produced by different psychotherapeutic approaches, should be considered both an 
epistemically and a morally valuable stance (Fricker 2007.).
21  For example, refer to Storolow, Brandshaft and Atwood’s account of intersubjec-
tivity in psychoanalysis, the illusion of a neutral therapist and the need for the psycho-
analyst and their patient to build a relationship of mutual trust, (Storolow, Brandshaft 
and Atwood 1987).
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Research has shown that therapeutic effectiveness is not produced by the psy-
chotherapeutic theory itself, but by the development of mutual understand-
ing between the therapist and their client. Explorations and meta-analyses of 
the success rates of different approaches to psychotherapy have shown that 
the common features of effective therapy surpass the frameworks defined by 
particular doctrines, methods and techniques, and thus cannot be reduced 
to the implementation of procedures related to a certain psychotherapeutic 
school (Lambert, Hansen, Umphress, et al. 1996, Lambert and Barley 2002)
Regardless of the variety of factors and numerous different perceptions of 
their importance in effective psychotherapy, all research accentuates the crit-
ical role of the relationship between the therapist and their patient. More 
recent research has further diminished the importance of particular psycho-
therapeutic methods; the specific type of psychotherapeutic approach war-
rants for only 1% of the efficacy of the psychotherapeutic process; instead 
underlining factors such as jointly defined goals, empathy, therapeutic con-
nection, positive affirmations, congruence and the character of the thera-
pist (Laska, Gurman, Wampold 2014). In their works, Messer and Wampold 
conclude that shared factors ultimately prevail over specific methodologi-
cal procedures in ensuring effective psychotherapy (Messer and Wampold 
2002, Wampold 2001). The ratio of variability related to shared factors such 
as the placebo effect, productive relationships, therapeutic connections and 
the competence of the therapist far surpasses the variance entailed by spe-
cific methodological components. Research also suggests that all psycho-
therapeutic approaches share the factor of mutual understanding between 
the therapist and their patient (Tracey et al., 2003).
In psychotherapy, understanding is developed through a hermeneutical pro-
cess of being receptive to new modes of interpretation in order not to suc-
cumb to outmoded patterns of understanding or harmful assumptions. While 
assumptions often lead to misunderstandings and false impressions, psycho-
therapy aims to provide both the therapist and the patient with knowledge 
unavailable to them prior to the therapy. The hermeneutical approach to psy-
chotherapy considers every psychotherapeutic encounter a hermeneutical 
act, treating interpretations as means of fulfilling therapeutic goals, rather 
than as objective accounts of the patient’s condition. Namely, a therapeutic 
approach that postulates psychotherapeutic theories as objective knowledge 
entails the implicit epistemology of perceiving subjective interpretations as 
true claims about the patient’s mental state.22
22  New psychopathological research on psychotherapeutic theories and the concepts 
of mental disorders (Bolton 2008.) shows that there is no objective standpoint that would 
not put the patient in a therapeutically detrimental position of epistemic asymmetry. 
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Despite receiving the education of a psychoanalyst, Storolow is a propo-
nent of the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy, who has repeatedly 
shown that the concepts of a neutral (or objective) psychotherapeutic act and 
an objectively grounded therapist are unsustainable. He has argued for re-
placing the ideal of an analytical therapist with the concept that a therapist 
ought to focus on, as far as possible, opening, illuminating and transforming 
the patient’s subjective world. It is entirely commonsensical that a therapist 
cannot avoid using interpretations as a legitimate method of understanding 
their patient’s experience and advancing towards therapeutic aims. However, 
these interpretations must strive to facilitate mutual understanding instead 
of attempting to explain the patient’s experience by subjecting it to a pre-
sumably appropriate theoretical framework. Therefore, Storolow suggests 
that the principle of a neutral therapist should be reformulated to describe a 
therapist who directs their interventions to opening, illuminating and trans-
forming the patient’s subjective world (Storolow, Brandshaft, Atwood 1987.) 
This request could be defined as a demand for the usage of the hermeneuti-
cal approach to psychotherapy, correctly recognized by Storolow as a ben-
eficial contribution to the effectiveness of the psychotherapeutic process.
This implies that effective psychotherapeutic practice is not the product of 
a potentially counter-productive objectivistic approach, but of a hermeneu-
tical approach which caters to the development of understanding between 
the therapist and their patient, thereby increasing the likelihood of accom-
plishing all relevant psychotherapeutic aims.
6. The psychotherapeutic encounter as an epistemic situation 
of testimony 
The definition of a communicational act generally includes both verbal and 
written statements, as well as non-verbal communicational cues such as nod-
ding or shaking one’s head, waving one’s hand, or like. In order for an ex-
change between agents to be classified as a communicational act, it ought to 
involve an exchange of information. The exchanged information can be either 
perceived23 or explicitly communicated. Therefore, not every communica-
tional act can be considered, in the epistemic sense, a situation of testimony. 
While every expression can be evaluated as a communicational act, testimo-
nies are a specific kind of communicational acts in which the speaker delib-
erately conveys information that the hearer uses to form a particular belief. 
Whereas Duncan Pritchard defines testimonies as deliberate verbal exchang-
es of information, Jennifer Lackey lowers the requirements by defining them 
23  Certain information can be attained through an individual’s perception, e.g. infor-
mation about the vocal tone of a singer. 
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as the hearer’s acquisition of information through written or spoken words 
regardless of the presence of deliberate intent (Pritchard 2004, Lackey 2006). 
Testimony can be broadly understood as mere dialogue, the realization of 
certain conversational contributions, the ability to learn from listening or, 
in the broadest sense, as ‘general communication’ (Fricker 1995, Prijić-Sa-
maržija 2007, Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 2012). It can also be understood as a 
speech act conducted with the clear intention of transferring information or 
as an expression of personal thoughts and beliefs which may be directed to-
wards everyone or to nobody in particular. Regardless of what definition we 
may choose to rely on, and the complexity of the chosen definition, we might 
agree with the claim that every psychotherapeutic encounter involves the de-
liberate transfer of beliefs between two people - a therapist and their patient. 
It is crucial to note that, within a psychotherapeutic communicational act, 
testimonies do not lead to truth understood as the formation of true beliefs 
or the acquisition of knowledge about the world. As previously mentioned, 
communication that qualifies as a testimony ought to meet the condition of 
enabling the hearer to form true beliefs. It is emphasized that these beliefs 
must satisfy the epistemic condition of truth. As we have already argued, 
the aim of a psychotherapeutic communicational act that is initiated by the 
patient is not (or is not primarily) to equip the patient/therapist with true 
information or to define a true diagnosis, but to resolve the patient’s mental 
suffering and reach subjectively defined therapeutic aims. Namely, the spec-
ificity of this communicational activity lies in its deviation from the tradi-
tional testimonial aim of equipping the therapist with true confessions or 
providing the patient with a true account of external reality, but to ease the 
patient’s suffering. Psychotherapy could thus be understood as a certain de-
viation from the usual understanding of testimony, due to its focus on resolv-
ing problems through communication between a therapist and their patient, 
rather than on the formation of true beliefs. Since testimonies in psycho-
therapy do not necessarily lead to the kind of true beliefs attained through, 
for example, education, they could be treated as a deviation from classical 
testimonies, but not as the ‘pathology’ of testimony. Given that truth is not 
the final aim of testimonies in psychotherapy, should we wonder whether 
a psychotherapeutic encounter that doesn’t strive towards truth deviates 
from usual testimonies in a manner similar to that of, for example, a lie? Un-
doubtedly, psychotherapeutic encounters are not about transmitting propo-
sitional knowledge from one person to another, but rather about conveying 
beliefs, lived experiences, emotional responses and even personal imagin-
ings. We could state that a psychotherapeutic communicational act involves 
the transmission of immediately available subjective beliefs such as person-
al mental states. It seems commonsensical to assume that everyone can be 
a reliable source of such beliefs. If the very definition of a testimony makes 
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it epistemically valuable for the hearer, that is, if a communicational act has 
to comply with its epistemic duty of providing a source of true and justified 
beliefs in order to be considered a testimony, then psychotherapeutic en-
counters in which true beliefs are based on the patient’s true account of their 
immediate experience ought to be regarded as representative examples of 
testimonies. However, the psychotherapeutic context often provides us with 
testimonies that cannot be considered true beliefs. This is best illustrated by 
delusions, or untrue beliefs about external reality, such as reliance on scien-
tifically unproven methods of treating malign illnesses or intense states of 
grief when a person who has undergone personal loss believes that they can 
still communicate with their loved one. Such a patient perceives their expe-
rience as true despite lacking the epistemic competence of recognizing truth. 
However, the patient is not lying. In other words, since their words cannot 
be disqualified as a lie, it would be inaccurate to speak of a proper ‘pathology 
of testimony’ (Coady 2006.). Not even the therapist taking part in a psycho-
therapeutic communicational act has to regard truth as the ultimate aim of 
the testimony. As already mentioned, the fact that the beliefs expressed by 
the therapist can determine the outcome of therapy compels the therapist 
to direct their behavior towards the patient’s welfare, rather than towards 
mere truth. However, it is important to note that, in order to achieve mutu-
al trust, the patient must want to honestly convey their experience and the 
therapist must want to openly understand it. In either case, both parties act 
as epistemically responsible participants of a communicational act. There-
fore, although a psychotherapeutic encounter can be defined as a certain de-
viation from exemplary testimonies or paradigmatic communicational acts, 
it possesses considerable epistemic value. Despite the psychotherapist’s lib-
erty to use their imagination in order to reach the defined therapeutic aims, 
the therapist’s choice of words is deliberately attuned to the patient’s rules 
of rationality and coherence in order to make their statements comprehen-
sible within the patient’s mental framework. This provides the basis for as-
sessing the epistemic competence of the psychotherapist. Recollecting Co-
ady’s description of lying within a testimony as a ‘pathological intention’, the 
psychotherapist’s intention cannot be disregarded as ‘pathological’ in being 
epistemically irresponsible deliberate deception (Coady 2006.). The psycho-
therapist is not deceiving the patient, but rather using the rules of dialogue 
defined by the psychiatric profession in order to enable the patient to ap-
propriately respond to their claims. A psychotherapeutic communicational 
act leaves no room for lying and deliberate deceptions, from either the ther-
apist’s or the patient’s side, as the patient strives to honestly convey infor-
mation and the therapist aims to fulfill therapeutic goals. The psychothera-
pist strives to simultaneously provide the patient with so-called functional 
beliefs or beliefs capable of resolving their problem and address the formal 
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demands of preserving the patient’s autonomy, self-confidence and self-re-
spect, thus expanding their perceived personal freedom. 
We may relate this to Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar’s inquiry about the fic-
tional testimony where author does not intend to convey the truth, “but to 
make the audience imagine possible situations or sequences of events, thus 
making the reader’s attitude towards fiction more akin to imagination than 
belief…the fact that a work is fictional does not discount the truthfulness 
of its contents” (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 2012: 69). It is important to ap-
proach the relationship between imagining and believing by taking into ac-
count the audience’s different attitudes towards fictional and non-fictional 
content. Therefore, “when speaking of non-fiction, the audience expects true 
information or an account of the world that they can consider true. In the 
case of fiction, the audience accepts the presented content while remaining 
fully aware that its main aim is to fulfill, generally speaking, artistic goals” 
(Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 2012: 69). Analogously, the patient expects the 
testimonies spoken during the psychotherapeutic encounter to fulfill their 
pragmatic function of producing beliefs capable of resolving their initial 
problem, i.e., of achieving the set therapeutic goals. For example, a therapist 
who offers their patient an account of another therapist’s successful treat-
ment of depressive states through dialogue and physical exercise, may en-
courage the patient to seek similar recovery or develop beneficial new habits. 
Let us recall once more Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar’s reflection on fiction 
“everyone involved in this venture clearly understands that the author does 
not intend to lie or deceptively misrepresent falsehoods as truths. The au-
thor’s intention respects the imperative of the social ‘game’ to provide their 
audience with what it expects.” (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar, 2012: 72). Likewise, 
the patient doesn’t intend to lie, the therapist tries to direct their patient’s 
existing resources towards reaching the goals defined by psychotherapy as 
a socially recognized method of resolving psychological, emotional and be-
havioral problems. Encouraging a patient to visualize a version of themselves 
that has already reached the therapeutic aims of, for example, self-confidence 
and tranquility, by describing an appropriate future narrative, is a common 
psychotherapeutic procedure based on the fact that the very act of imagining 
oneself as, for example, self-confident and tranquil, can produce feelings of 
self-confidence and tranquility, thus making them seem as a realistic pros-
pect. Despite the fact that such a narrative cannot be considered a transfer 
of current truths due to its dependence on imagining and reference to the 
future, its therapeutic effect is derived from acknowledging true information 
about the patient, their social circumstances and the likelihood of achieving 
therapeutic aims. The psychotherapist’s testimony must have the qualities of 
conscientiousness, rationality and coherence. A patient’s testimony of their 
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personal experiences is comparably truthful in their desire not to deceive the 
therapist. The achievement of therapeutic goals always necessitates a certain 
change to the patient’s self-perception. We can therefore conclude that the 
epistemic responsibility of neither the psychotherapist nor the patient can 
be considered compromised in a manner similar to Coady’s description of 
pathologies (Coady 2006). The psychotherapist is obliged to satisfy the epis-
temic criteria of clarity, consistency and compliance with the patient’s epis-
temic habits, and is required to possess epistemic competence proportional 
to the statements offered during the psychotherapeutic encounter. In that 
sense, we might call for some kind of epistemic justification of the psycho-
therapist’s claims. Furthermore, it is extremely important to emphasize that 
a valid psychotherapeutic communicational act cannot include the intention 
of either the psychotherapist or the patient to misrepresent a falsehood as a 
truth, or the desire to ascribe epistemic justification to an unjustified claim. 
We can therefore conclude that a psychotherapeutic communicational act 
is not an example of a pathological misuse of testimony, unlike Coady’s de-
scription of deliberately misrepresented lies as pathologies. 
Given that Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar’s account has shown us that the epis-
temic benefit of forming true beliefs isn’t the key criterion of distinguish-
ing non-pathological from pathological testimonies, a testimony expressed 
during a psychotherapeutic communicational act remains epistemically valu-
able despite deviating from traditional testimonies (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 
2012.). It is essential for the patient to benefit from the exchange by forming 
beliefs about themselves/external reality capable of leading to psychothera-
peutic goals. This can undoubtedly be considered the epistemic value of such 
testimonies. Namely, a psychotherapeutic communicational act is unique 
in the patient’s intention to change their current state by engaging in dia-
logue with their therapist. It is reasonable to assume that the patient hopes 
for the therapeutic dialogue to alter their current beliefs and produce better 
future beliefs. The patient listens to their therapist’s statements, claims and 
beliefs with the hope that some of them may inspire a change in their own 
beliefs. It is irrelevant whether these beliefs refer to the patient’s self-per-
ception or their account of external reality. The patient engages in therapy 
lacking a certain belief p, defines it as a therapeutic goal and believes that 
therapy may allow them to attain the belief p. For example, a patient can opt 
for therapy due to feelings of misery and inadequacy or a belief that they do 
not deserve to enjoy their life. They simultaneously believe that these be-
liefs can be altered in some yet unknown manner that will later allow them 
to feel more deserving of joy. The latter belief might have been encouraged 
by hearing positive feedback from earlier patients, trusting the authority of 
psychotherapists or various other personal attitudes towards psychotherapy. 
These reasons might cause them to believe that, despite the fact that they do 
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not currently believe p, they are capable of believing p within a year. In that 
sense, the patient trusts the psychotherapist to be a reliable, credible and re-
sponsible epistemic source of their future belief p. 
We can therefore conclude that a psychotherapeutic communicational act is 
not a pathology of testimony, but that it deviates from traditional commu-
nication in not evaluating epistemic benefits in terms of true beliefs. Given 
that a psychotherapeutic act breaches the epistemic responsibility of neither 
the therapist nor the patient, we cannot speak of it as a pathology of testimo-
ny. The evident epistemic benefits can be evaluated from their instrumental 
role in providing curative effects that would have been unreachable without 
such communication. Furthermore, a psychotherapeutic communicational 
act complies with the conditions of assessing speaker credibility and creat-
ing an environment of mutual trust. The hearer’s perception of the speaker’s 
trustworthiness in discursive exchanges related to personal understanding, 
such as psychotherapy, can be described as a demand for conscientious in-
terpretations, rather than for true claims. This description is the inevitable 
outcome of the hermeneutical attitude that multiple true interpretations are 
always possible and that the patient’s interpretation can be treated as their 
personal truth. In a hermeneutical context, the hearer exercises their epis-
temic responsibility by attempting to conscientiously interpret the speaker’s 
testimony in proportion to its consistency and coherence. Given that a valid 
psychotherapeutic communicational act cannot involve the intention to de-
ceive, its testimonies possess undeniable epistemic value. Moreover, a ther-
apist who takes part in a hermeneutic psychotherapeutic communicational 
act doesn’t approach their client’s testimony with the intention to subject it 
to classification, but instead treats it the starting point of further communi-
cation. On the contrary, the objectivistic approach to psychotherapy requires 
the therapist to classify their client’s testimony in accordance with certain 
normative and theoretical settings. Since the therapist dismisses the client’s 
claims as irrelevant to further communication, we cannot describe them as 
a testimony. While the objectivistic approach automatically disregards the 
patient as an epistemically irrelevant interlocutor, it places the therapist in a 
position of expertise and epistemic power. As only the therapist has access to 
information, we can conclude that they are in a privileged epistemic position. 
Having accepted the notion that the therapist’s understanding of the patient 
is superior to the patient’s own self-perception, all subsequent classifica-
tions, interpretations and their underlying theoretical foundations become 
the only possible relevant knowledge within a psychotherapeutic commu-
nicational act. The patient’s knowledge becomes a mere ‘polygon’ for clas-
sification, rather than an epistemically relevant contribution to continued 
psychotherapeutic dialogue. Such an approach automatically epistemically 
devalues the patient and excludes them from a relationship of epistemic trust. 
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The differences between the objectivistic and the hermeneutical approach to 
psychotherapy coincide with the introductory distinction between tradition-
al monist approaches to epistemology and virtue epistemology’s emphasis on 
individual intellectual virtue, rather than the truthfulness of a belief, as the 
main epistemic aim. This article attempted to demonstrate the importance 
of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice – in forms of both testimo-
nial and hermeneutical justice – as vital epistemic norms. Without explicitly 
scorning epistemic approaches focused on truth (or only truth), we have at-
tempted to emphasize the relevance of the approaches which divulge epis-
temic value from an individual agent’s epistemic justice. A psychotherapist 
who exercises epistemic justice in a psychotherapeutic communicational act 
is deserving of epistemic praise, regardless of the truth-status of their beliefs.
We have attempted to show that, even though the value turn in epistemology 
and the introduction of virtue epistemology have enabled the expansion of 
epistemic evaluation beyond the scope of exchanges of true beliefs, they have 
managed to maintain its significant epistemic value and focus on epistemic 
benefits. Likewise, hermeneutical psychotherapy has proven to be the opti-
mal framework for implementing this kind of epistemological evaluation. 
While the objectivist approach reflects the traditional epistemic focus on a 
monist account of truth, the hermeneutic approach perfectly corresponds 
to virtue epistemology. Moreover, we hold that the hermeneutic approach 
is not only epistemically justified within this new system of epistemic eval-
uation, but is also more likely to result in successful psychotherapy.
7. Conclusion
The expansion of the scope of epistemological topics was partially caused 
by a value turn which has enabled epistemological discussions to surpass 
the narrowly set framework of analyzing the concept of knowledge and the 
necessary conditions of its acquisition. Amongst other projects which have 
emerged from these new epistemological tendencies, the approach of virtue 
epistemology offered a theoretical and normative framework for the epis-
temic evaluation of various epistemic processes and activities (which had 
previously been entirely beyond the scope of epistemological focus). Com-
municational acts, such as the dialogue between a psychiatrist/psychologist 
and their patient, had previously been entirely exempt from any sort of epis-
temological analysis and were only assessed by narrow evaluation of psy-
chiatric/psychotherapeutic ‘objective’ appropriateness and efficacy. Once 
virtue epistemology had shifted its focus to the intellectual virtues of epis-
temic agents (rather than the truth-value of the proposition), all communi-
cational acts and their participants became legitimate objects of evaluation: 
their epistemic success was now measured also in terms of virtues such as 
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epistemic responsibility, intellectual consciousness and openness, self-reflex-
ivity, and sensitivity to stereotypes, prejudice and unjustified generalizations. 
We have attempted to show that the epistemic success of a communicational 
act between a psychiatrist/psychotherapist and their patient lies in the ther-
apist’s epistemically responsible attitude towards the patient’s problems, or, 
more precisely, their epistemically just avoidance of socially produced ste-
reotypes and prejudice. Our attitude was largely influenced by recent dis-
cussions within the philosophy of psychiatry, such as the newly introduced 
concept of hermeneutical psychotherapy. These discussions have underlined 
the difficulty (or sheer unlikelihood) of defining what is true in psychiatry/
psychotherapy due to the absence of an uncontroversial, objective or fully 
factual basis for diagnosing mental disorders.
Along these lines, we have attempted to illustrate the relevance of applying 
epistemology to concrete issues and to show that it can provide a norma-
tive framework and terminological foundation for evaluating highly specific 
epistemic processes, (Bishop and Trout 2005). Having opted for virtue epis-
temology as the normative framework of evaluating the epistemic benefits 
of psychotherapy, we have demonstrated that the objectivistic approach to 
psychotherapy cannot be considered a suitable basis of effective psychother-
apeutic practice due to its potentially detrimental and counter-productive 
effects. Conversely, the hermeneutical approach caters to the development of 
mutual understanding between the therapist and their patient and increases 
the likelihood of achieving all defined psychotherapeutic aims.24
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Epistemička pravda kao vrlina u hermeneutičkoj psihoterapiji
Apstrakt
Vrednosni obrt u epistemologiji generisao je jednu posebno uticajnu poziciju – 
epistemologiju vrline. Radi se o narastajuće uticajnom epistemološkom norma-
tivnom pristupu koji se odlučuje za intelektualne vrline epistemičkog agenta, pre 
nego za vrednost istinitosti propozicije, kao centralne epistemičke vrednosti. U 
prvom delu ovog članka pokušaćemo da kratko objasnimo taj vrednosni obrt i 
da ocrtamo osnovne aspekte epistemologije vrline, ističući raznovrsnost episte-
mičkih stavova povezanih sa ovim pristupom i njihov pozitivni uticaj na prošire-
nje epistemoloških horizonata. Drugi deo će biti usredsređen na vrline episte-
mičke odgovornosti i epistemičke pravde kao posebno podesnih za procenjivanje 
društvenih procesa kao što su, na primer, svedočenje i konverzacione prakse 
uopšte. U trećoj sekciji pokazaćemo kako psihijatrijski i psihoterapeutski komu-
nikativni akt može biti učinkovitije analiziran i procenjen iz prespektive vrline 
epistemičke pravde, nego kroz tradicionalni epistemički pristup zasnovan na mo-
nističkom pojmu istine. Četvrti i peti odeljak sintetišu diskusiju uvođenjem kon-
cepta hermeneutičke psihoterapije kao jednog terapeutski i epistemički pogod-
nog okvira za procenjivanje komunikativnih akata u psihoterapiji.
Ključne reči: epistemologija vrline, epistemička odgovornost, epistemička pravda, 
filozofija psihijatrije i psihoterapije, svedočenje, hermeneutička psihoterapija. 
